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Abstract
          With this study we provide evidence that the cognitive processes involved in addition/sub-
traction, mapped along the mental number line, seem to mediate our understanding of trading verbs. 
When left-to-right culture participants read "loss" verbs, cognitive activation moves "leftward" as in 
arithmetical subtraction, while reading "gain" verbs activates a mental rightward space as in addi-
tion. 
          We test this hypothesis by asking to a group of participants to use their left and right hand in 
judging (as correct of not) the syntactic form of several verbs meaning financial outcomes. Results 
show that processing “gain verbs” was associated with shorter latencies when responding with the 
right hand similarly when performing an addition task, while processing “loss verbs” was associated 
with shorter latencies when responding with the left, similarly when performing a subtraction task. 
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This finding suggests that understanding language denoting economics outcomes covertly engages 
the arithmetical system in a spatially left-right dimension.
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Introduction
            Researches investigating the nature of cognitive processes engaged in mentally representing 
economical outcomes are growing. Monetary  Gains and Losing could universally symbolize the 
most representative icons of this matter since their immediate effects on the general people well-
being and on the quality of their life.
          Several researches in the cognitive sciences and financial economics deeply describe factors 
characterizing the inextricable interdependence between rationality and emotion [1, 2, 3, 4, 5.] in in-
fluencing human economical choices and behaviors (See also [6] for a complete review). Loewen-
stein [1], for instance, underlines  the impact of immediate emotions, and therefore the wide range 
of visceral factors with them associated, in determining systematic behaviors that could be  also 
amenable in a formal model. 
            However, scant attention was concentrated on cognitive mechanisms involved in the extra-
polation of economical meanings and their verbal communication. 
In this sense, the Mental accounting theory [7], a recent proposal from the field of the beha-
vioural  economy,  seems representing some intriguing suggestion.  This proposal  attempts  to  de-
scribe the process whereby people code, categorize and evaluate economic outcomes. For this mod-
el,  a real  set of  mental  operations is used by individuals in order to organize, evaluate, and keep 
track of their financial activities [8]. Since one of the basal assumptions of this model sustains that 
accounting operations are engaged in evaluating economical outcomes,  one could hypothesize a 
specific role of the arithmetic brain processes in understanding financial meaning and their verbal 
communication. According to this assumption, “Gain” and “loss” verbs could be conceptualized as 
results of two mental accounting operations such as “addition” and “subtraction”. In fact, people 
could metaphorically represent gain outcomes as one improving of their economical wealth while 
loss outcomes  as reduction of their economical wealth. 
           It was been well documented in behavioural and brain literature the direct link between num-
bers, arithmetic operations, such as addition and subtraction, and left-to-right vectorial space. Mc-
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Crink [9] firstly have shown, when performing approximate additions and subtractions, participants 
favour larger numbers for addition and smaller numbers for subtraction. Knops et al., [10] add in-
formation to this issue by demonstrating that  during nonsymbolic addition, the subjects preferen-
tially selected numbers at the upper right location, whereas during subtraction, they were biased to-
ward the upper left location. The same group of researchers [11] further expanded this evidence by 
reporting a pattern of eye movement shifts to the left or to the right, during execution of arithmetic 
operations in association to posterior parietal cortex activation. Results of this study are consistent 
with the suggestion that mental arithmetic co-opts parietal circuitry associated with spatial coding. 
All these evidences seems resonating the most know SNARC (Space Number Association response 
Code) effect [12]  sustaining that populations in left-to-right reading cultures are endowed with a 
left–to–right mental number line (MNL) that accounts for a faster left hand response when numbers 
are relatively small and, vice versa, a faster right hand response when numbers are relatively large 
[13]. 
In order to test the mental account hypothesis, we selected a corpus of verbs (Trading verbs) 
describing economical outcomes (gain vs. loss meanings). The purpose was to investigate whether 
arithmetic operations such as addition and subtraction are covertly simulated when people read gain 
a loss verbs respectively.  Therefore we asked to a group of participants using their left and right 
hand in judging (as correct of not) the syntactic form of several verbs. 
Given the direct relation between arithmetic operations (addition vs. subtraction) and spatial co-
ordinates (left vs. right), as effect of the MNL displacement, we expected processing “gain verbs” 
would be associated with shorter latencies when responding with the right hand similarly when per-
forming an addition task, while “loss verbs” would be associated with shorter latencies when re-
sponding with the left, similarly when performing a subtraction task. 
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Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty two right-handed graduate students (10 men, 12 women, mean age:26 ± 7.03 years) with 
normal or corrected vision participated in the studies after providing written informed consent. They 
were recruited from the University of Trieste. 
Procedure and instruments
Subjects had to judge, in two consecutive sessions, the correct vs. no sense meaning of 108 verbs. 
Half of these were spelt correctly (54); of which 18 (6 verbs X 3 trials) indicated a “gain”, 18 (6 
verbs X 3 trials) a “loss” (Trading verbs) and 18 Thinking verbs (6 verbs X 3 trials) (see Table 1 for 
further details). Verbs were displayed in the first person and in the simple present tense. The within  
subjects variable was the responding hand. Data from one participant were excluded because his ac-
curacy was less than 80%. Responses that were ± than 3.5 standard deviations away from the parti-
cipant’s mean in the given condition were not considered for the analysis. The hand-verb mapping 
was reversed across two separate sessions and their order counterbalanced across participants. 
Tradin
g
Gain 
verbs
Incassare
(to cash)
Riscuotere
(to cash)
Ricavare
(to derive)
Guadagnare
(to gain)
Intascare
(to rake in)
Arricchire
(to enrich) 
Loss   
verbs
Pagare
(to pay)
Risarcire
(to 
compensate
)
Esaurire
(to spend)
Perdere
(to lose)
Saldare
(to pay)
Impoverire
(to  
impoverish)
Thinking
Verbs
Ritenere
(to  
consider)
Credere
(to believe)
Supporre
(to  
suppose)
Pensare
(to think) 
Immaginare
(to imagine) 
Sperare
(to hope)
 Table1: A summary of trading verbs used in the experiment. Thinking verbs (baseline) are also in-
cluded.
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Results
In order to evaluate the grade of familiarity of participants for each of the verbs considered a post-
task questionnaire was administered them. Participants were asked to refer their subjective level of 
experience with all the verbs by using a five point rating scale, so that the higher the score referred 
to a verb the higher their perceived familiarity. The repeated-measure ANOVA in comparing fa-
miliarity rate for these verb categories led to significant differences [F(2, 40)=35.00,  p < .001]. 
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that both types of Trading Verbs significantly differed from the con-
trol category (To think: M=4.753 ± 0.250 vs. To gain: M= 3.531 ± 0.922 SD, p < .001; To think: M= 
4.789 ± 0.234 vs. To lose: M= 3.515 ± 0.783 SD,  p < .001), while no difference was observed 
between them (p < .100). On further RT analysis, participants proved faster at pressing a left key 
with the left index finger when verbs described loss and, vice versa, at pressing a right key with the 
right index finger when verbs described gain  [Hand laterality  x Verb meaning interaction:  F(1, 
20)=13.40, p < .001; see Fig. 1], while the main effects of hand laterality [F(1, 20)=0.50, p < .821] 
and verb meaning [F(1, 20)=0.16, p < .690 were not significant]. 
Fig.  1. The interplay  between  spatial  representation  and  the  comprehension  of  economic 
verbs. Reaction times for correct responses of trading verbs were normalized by dividing them with 
those obtained with thinking verbs. Vertical bars indicate Standard Error. LH stands for the left in-
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dex finger used for correctly spelt responses; RH for the right index finger for incorrectly spelt 
ones.
Post-hoc Duncan test comparisons revealed that participants were significantly faster with gain-
right and loss-left  mappings,  independently of the hand used or the verb type [loss verbs.  left: 
(Mean) M= 1.185 ± 0.151 SD vs. right: M= 1.237 ± 0170 SD, p < .04; gain verbs. left: M= 1.256 ± 
0.16 SD vs. right M= 1.186 ± 0.113, p < .01)]. 
Discussion
According  to  the  body-specificity  hypothesis,  Daniel  Casasanto  [14]  has  shown  that 
mappings from spatial location to emotional valence differed between right-handed and left-handed 
participants.  Right-handers tended to associate rightward space with positive ideas and leftward 
space with negative ideas, but left-handers showed the opposite pattern, associating rightward space 
with  negative  ideas  and  leftward  with  positive  ideas.  The  author  speculates  that  both  groups 
implicitly associate good things more strongly with their dominant side: the side on which they can 
act more fluently with their dominant hands. In similar fashion, we founded shorter  latencies  in 
judging “gain verbs” when participants responded with their right hand, and in judging “loss verbs” 
when participants responded with their left hand.   
              Although results reported in the present study may reflect a similar implicit body-specific 
preferences of right and left handers, since gain verbs might be codified as emotionally positive and 
loss verbs as emotionally negative, there are indirect evidences suggesting that cognitive processes 
involved in addition/subtraction, mapped along the mental number line, might likely to mediate this 
phenomenon of language meaning/space compatibility. Accordingly we suggest that when left-to-
right culture participants read “loss” verbs, their cognitive activation moves “leftward” as in arith-
metical subtraction, while reading “gain” verbs activates a mental rightward space as in addition. 
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             Interesting insights addressing this assumption originate from researches concerning specif-
ic learning difficulties in mathematics (i.e. developmental dyscalculia) that frequently co-occur with 
impairments in reading (i.e. developmental dyslexia). This co-morbidity has been put in relation to 
the malfunctioning of the left angular gyrus, a brain area that has been found to be affected in pa-
tients with Gerstmann syndrome [15] who show not only acalculia but also left–right disorientation 
(see [16] for a recent review).
That mental accounting mechanisms may subserve the understanding of abstract economical 
meaning such as that suggested by our verbs is also consistent with  involvements of Intraparietal 
Sulcus (IPS), an area of overlap between calculation, language and saccades tasks, detected in the 
left posterior segment of the IPS (Intraparietal Sulcus) beneath the left angular gyrus [17]. This area 
has been identified as the neural correlate of the mental accounting and linguistic competence inter-
play.  Further evidences derives from a study on patients with cortico-basal degeneration (CBD) 
who showed a severe difficulty in understanding small number as well as quantifier terms [18]. Giv-
en the linguistic relation of number processing and quantifiers [18], one could assume that verbs in-
dicating a gain or a loss could be mentally represented with similar mechanisms.  
            Preliminary support for this assumption comes from a previous study investigating quantifi-
er comprehension in healthy adults [19]. Semantic theory made a general distinction between first-
order quantifiers identify a number state (e.g. "at least 3") and higher-order quantifiers requiring to 
actively maintain a number of state in working memory for comparison with another state (e.g. "less 
than half"). Authors reported that first-order and higher-order quantifiers both recruit right inferior 
parietal cortex, suggesting that a numerosity component contributes to quantifier comprehension. In 
fact, parietal activation was also widely reported in subjects asked to perform a simple number pro-
cessing tasks [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] or arithmetic tasks [ 11, 25, 26].
Given the parietal  activation reported in all these neuroimaging researches investigating the pro-
cessing of abstract quantifier, number and arithmetic operations, one could consider these findings 
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as preliminary support for the suggestion of an involvement of these neural circuits in the under-
standing of economical meanings as that provided by verbs used in the present study .
In conclusion, we suggest that understanding financial language covertly engages the arith-
metical system in a spatially left-right dimension that is consistent with the current view that the 
parietal  cortex mediates  the interplay  between sensory-perceptual  domains  and abstract  thought 
[27]. Further researches with brain imaging methods are needed in order to test whether the func-
tional involvement of parietal circuits engaged during calculation [28, 29] undergo the linguistic 
representation of economical outcomes. 
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